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Sherman Minton was not a great U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
but he was far better than the image that scholars have created for
him would indicate. Although there are exceptions, scholars generally
consider Minton to have been an ineffective Justice who was put on
the bench only because he was a crony of President Harry Truman.
Indeed, the scholars who periodically provide a list of the "greatest"
and "worst" Justices inevitably relegate Minton to the "worst"
category. For example, Bernard Schwartz, who classified Minton as
one of the ten worst Justices, said Minton "was below mediocrity as a
Justice. His opinions, relatively few for his tenure, are less than thirdrate, characterized by their cavalier approach to complicated issues."1
This Article attempts to provide a fairer and more informed
assessment of Minton's tenure as a Supreme Court Justice. It first will
explore the shortcomings of judicial ranking schemes and then
illustrate how the biases in these schemes have resulted in an unfair
Professor of Political Science at Indiana University Southeast. The author wishes to
thank Andrew J. Perryman for his valuable research assistance for this Article, and Jim St. Clair
for his helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the Article. Also, the author is
indebted to the Lilly Library at Indiana University for generously providing copies of letters from
the Sherman Minton collection.
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757

758

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2:757

evaluation of Minton's record. The remainder of the Article will
provide a more in-depth analysis and explanation of Minton's
philosophy of judicial restraint and how it guided his approach to
judicial decisionmaking.
I. MINTON AND FLAWED RANKING SCHEMES

A. A Critiqueof JudicialRankings
In 1978, Blaustein and Mersky reported the results of a poll of
sixty-five experts. 2 Of the ninety-six Justices assessed, fifty-five were
rated as average, six were ranked below average, and eight were
deemed to be failures. 3 Together these Justices represented over
seventy percent of the Justices who had served on the Court up to the
time of the poll. Further undermining the validity of these ranking
schemes is the fact that those asked to make the ratings were not
given any standards by which to make their judgments. 4 A set of
standards at least forces evaluators to look systematically at the
subject rather than allowing them to rely on personal impressions.
Critics of judicial rankings point to the inevitable flaws in the
ranking systems. At a Symposium on "neglected Justices" in April
2008, G. Edward White noted numerous methodological problems with
the Blaustein and Mersky ratings. He concluded that they had
"totaled up the grades each Justice had received, drawn lines between
aggregate grades at various points, placed Justices in categories based
on those lines, and then attempted, without much help from their
respondents, to explain what their categories signified about judicial
performance. The categories had not signified much."5 Particularly
pertinent in Minton's assessment is White's observation that the
Justices who are listed as failures "were all twentieth-century figures,
and all associated by respondents with 'anti-progressive' postures
toward economic regulation, civil rights, or other forms of Warren
Court activism." 6 Their careers, White noted, "had been recent enough
to offend the sensibilities of late 1960s progressives and civil
libertarians." 7 Mersky himself acknowledges the methodological

2.
ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES:
STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1978).

3.
4.
5.
(2009).
6.
7.

Id. at 38-40.
Id. at 36.
G. Edward White, Neglected Justices:Discounting for History, 62 VAND. L. REv. 319, 340
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.

2009]

SHERMAN MINTON

759

shortcomings of rankings, pointing to the small number of observers
who generate the rankings and the academic orientations of the
evaluators-mostly law professors. Plus, Mersky says these ratings
tend to have a liberal bias that could translate into a bias in favor of
activist Justices, 8 which is relevant to their assessment of Minton,
who was one of the Court's staunchest advocates of judicial restraint.
Labeling Justices as "failures" is a far more pernicious exercise
than identifying those Justices who were great. The latter is a much
more edifying effort, although it too suffers from the lack of agreedupon criteria for determining what entitles a Justice to such a high
status. For example, Justices Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter,
and William Douglas are included in some scholars' lists of the
greatest Justices, but not in others. In a noteworthy effort, Robert C.
Bradley 9 focused only on whether a Justice was great, not whether one
was a failure, and broadened the base of respondents by including four
different groups-judicial scholars, state judges, attorneys, and
undergraduate and graduate students in law-related courses. The lists
produced by each group had some similarities, but there were still
significant differences.1 0 Further, each group used different criteria for
its rankings.11 Despite Bradley's effort to be more systematic in
developing his list of "great" Justices, his research suffers from the
same methodological problems as the work by Blaustein and Mersky.
As White notes, "The evaluative criteria applied by respondents
remained elusive, and the tendency of evaluators to equate
prominence in a Justice with familiarity with that Justice's career
12
resurfaced."
B. Bias of Rankings Against Minton
In 1997, Bernard Schwartz, in his Book of Legal Lists, included
13
Minton as among the "ten worst Supreme Court [J]ustices."
According to Schwartz, Minton's shortcomings stemmed from his
tendency to defer to the legislative branch of government and to read

8.

Roy M. Mersky & Gary R. Hartman, Rankings of the Justices, in THE OXFORD

COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 707, 707-08 (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
1992).

9.

Robert C. Bradley, Selecting and Ranking Great Justices: Poll Results, in LEADERS OF

THE PACK: POLLS AND CASE STUDIES OF GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1, 2-4 (William D.

Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 2003).
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 4-6.
12. White, supranote 5, at 343.
13.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 29.
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statutes too literally at the expense of individual rights. Among the
cases cited as evidence of Minton's failures are his rulings in United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, in which he upheld a government
decision to preclude entry of a German-born wife of a military veteran
into the United States without a hearing; 14 and Adler v. Board of
Education, in which he upheld the constitutionality of a New York
state law that barred members of subversive organizations from
employment as teachers in public schools.' 5 Also frequently cited is
United States v. Rabinowitz, a case in which Minton upheld as
"reasonable" a search incident to arrest of a stamp collector's
offices
without a search warrant. 16 These cases invariably are cited as
reasons for Minton's failure as a Justice.
In truth, Minton's decisions, which are treated in depth below,
may be hard to defend by today's standards, but they can be explained
in a more objective way than his critics have considered them. Most of
his criticized decisions came during the Cold War era and have to be
evaluated against the backdrop of the time. To evaluate Minton on the
basis of a few cases would be the equivalent of judging Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who is always ranked among the greatest Justices, on the
basis of his opinion in Buck v. Bell, which upheld a Virginia law that
permitted
the
sterilization
of individuals,
including
the
"feebleminded."'17 It might also be like evaluating Hugo Black, also
considered to be among the greatest Justices, for his support of the
Court's unanimous opinion that the U.S. government had the power to
relocate thousands of Japanese-Americans to internment camps
during World War II because they were deemed to be a threat to the
United States' war effort.' 8
Robert W. Langran 19 argues that some of the Justices who are
considered "failures" have been treated more harshly than they
deserve because of the biases of some evaluators. While Langran
attempts to rectify the unjust ratings of several of the Justices, he
concludes that Minton's status as a failure might have more merit. He
claims that Minton authored only one major opinion: Adler, which was
overturned fifteen years later. 20 Langran, ignoring his own advice for a
more careful examination of a Justice's record, indicts Minton on
14. 338 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1950).
15. 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
16. 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
17. 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927).
18. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
19. Robert W. Langran, Why Are Some Supreme Court Justices Rated as "Failures?,
in 1985
Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 8-14.
20. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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various grounds: "[He] did little during his time on the Court, and he
seemed to like practical politics more than he liked his time on the
Court (he basically took the job as a favor to Truman, much like
Byrnes and Roosevelt). 2 1
Langran's condemnation is easy to refute, especially as
concerns the criticism that Minton did little on the Court. Minton was
a hard worker who wrote his fair share of majority opinions that
covered every category of law. During Minton's tenure on the Court,
all of the Justices together wrote 590 majority opinions, including
sixty per curiam opinions. The mean number of majority opinions for
each Justice was 65.5. Minton wrote a total of sixty-four. 22 Further, he
took on the task of writing some of the less glamorous opinions. For
example, he wrote every opinion on tax lien cases heard during his
time on the Court, sparing his colleagues this less-than-desirable task.
He was praised in various scholarly publications for the quality of
some of his opinions, including Barrows v. Jackson23 and Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin.24 Those who have studied his judicial
record in depth have reached conclusions about Minton's
achievements on the Court that are far different from Langran's
25
impressionistic assessment.
Eschewing previous approaches to evaluating judicial
performance, White offers another more positive and thoughtful
approach to identifying "great" Justices in The Great American
Judicial Tradition.26 White constructs profiles of Justices spanning
from John Marshall to each member of the Rehnquist Court and
provides an in-depth discussion of their judicial philosophies and
illustrative opinions. He identifies three minimum requirements of
competent judging that transcend all great appellate opinions, thus
offering the reader some standards to distinguish great Justices from
lesser ones. White argues that these characteristics, "analytical

21. Id. at 14.
22. David N. Atkinson, Opinion Writing on the Supreme Court, 1949-1956: The- Views of
Justice Sherman Minton, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 105, 116 (1975).
23. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
24. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
25.

LINDA C. GUGIN & JAMES E. ST. CLAIR, SHERMAN MINTON: NEW DEAL SENATOR, COLD

WAR JUSTICE 277-82 (1997); Harry L. Wallace, Mr. Justice Minton-Hoosier Justice on the
Supreme Court, 34 IND. L.J. 145, 145-46 (1959); David Neal Atkinson, Mr. Justice Minton and

the Supreme Court, 1949-1956, at 351-59 (June 1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Iowa) (on file with author); Elizabeth Ann Hull, Sherman Minton and the Cold War
Court 304-11 (Nov. 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research) (on
file with author).
26.

G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING

AMERICAN JUDGES 473 (3d ed. 2007).
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soundness, intelligibility, and rationality," transcend the great
appellate opinions "in which judging has resembled high art and
statecraft."2 7 Without attempting to place Minton on the same plane
as the Justices profiled by White, it is fair to say that he did achieve
these characteristics at times in his opinion writing.
II. REASSESSING MINTON
A. Minton's Philosophy of JudicialRestraint
Any fair assessment of Minton's Supreme Court tenure first
requires an explanation of his judicial philosophy of self-restraint.
Perhaps more than any of the other Justices on the Court at the time
or since, Minton was staunchly committed to a limited role for the
Court. In this regard, he had much in common with Felix Frankfurter,
with whom he served on the Vinson and Warren Courts, and John
Marshall Harlan II, with whom he served one year on the Warren
Court; however, Minton was less flexible in his approach to deciding
cases than either Frankfurter or Harlan.
A brief exploration of the counter-majoritarian dilemma
clarifies how Minton's self-restraint approach fits in the evolution of
constitutional jurisprudence. The counter-majoritarian dilemma
involves the question of whether judicial decisionmaking, insulated
from public opinion, can be reconciled with democratic norms. The
dilemma is most apparent when a small number of unelected judges
invalidate laws made by elected representatives. As White points out,
the counter-majoritarian dilemma has been cited as a justification for
both judicial activism and judicial restraint. According to White,
contemporary postures about the appropriateness of judicial
intervention stem from the 1938 Carolene Products case, 28 which
delineated the appropriate areas for activism or constraint. Under
that framework, deference to legislatures was appropriate "when they
sought to regulate the economy or redistribute benefits because
legislatures are more accountable to the citizenry at large." 29 On the
other hand, deference was not required "when legislatures specifically
contravened enumerated constitutional rights, blocked the channels of
political change by catering to established interest groups, or
discriminated against powerless minorities." 30 The distinction lay in

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151-54 (1938).
WHITE, supra note 26, at 461
Id.
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the views about judicial competence: in the area of economic
regulation, legislatures usually were presumed to be more competent
than the Court, but when it came to issues of the Bill of Rights or
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was
deemed to be more competent than legislatures. As a result, the Court
applied stricter scrutiny to legislation that infringed on individual
freedom or discriminated on the basis of race than to economic
legislation, which required only a rational basis for the legislation in
question.
In Carolene Products, the Court upheld a statute that
prohibited filled milk because it was an adulterated food that was
"injurious" to the public health. 31 The Court's deference to Congress
was based on its belief that such regulation clearly came within the
purview of the Commerce Clause and thus did not invade a power
reserved to the states. 32 Nor did it deprive the petitioners of their
property without due process. 33 Justices who relied on the view that
the primary limits on judicial powers were "the institutional
34
constraints of democratic theory" thought deference was justified.
Those who subscribed to the "living Constitution" interpretive theory
considered legislative action to be permissible because "modern
legislatures could experiment with reform legislation that had
hitherto been thought to trespass on individual rights because
changing social conditions demanded that response; courts should, in
35
most cases, allow legislatures to perform that function."
Although Minton was not on the Court in 1938, he certainly
would have subscribed to the majority view in Carolene Products. His
justification would have been rooted in both the institutional restraint
theory (based on majoritarian theory) as well as the "living
Constitution" theory. Minton's philosophy of judicial restraint erred on
the side of deferring to legislative prerogatives when it came to
economic regulation, as in Carolene Products, but he was far more
reticent than activists to hold that judicial intervention was necessary
to protect democratic values or to guard individual rights. The one
exception to that view was in the area of civil rights, where Minton
36
usually supported judicial intervention to protect minority rights.
31.
32.
33.

304 U.S. at 146, 154.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 148.

34.

WHITE, supra note 26, at 462

35. Id.
36. Illustrative of his views on equal rights are his strong and early support in Brown V.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine in
education, id. at 495, and his opinion in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), ensuring that
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Minton sought to avoid the counter-majoritarian dilemma of
judicial discretion by admonishing Justices not to substitute their
views for those of duly elected officials. In choosing among the
multiple justifications for judicial restraint, Minton generally
subscribed to the theory that the nature of the Court itself dictated a
need for restraint. Minton found it difficult to square unbridled
judicial discretion with his populist conception of democracy that
extolled the centrality of the common man. Minton firmly believed
that in a democratic society in which judges are not popularly elected
and enjoy life tenure, some kind of restraint must be imposed on the
power of jurists. To Minton, the Constitution laid out such a scheme
through separation of powers, which allocates to each branch a specific
set of responsibilities. Legislatures are supposed to legislate,
executives are supposed to enforce and implement, and courts are
supposed to adjudicate. Accordingly, Minton thought that courts must
be deferential to the exercise of the constitutional powers assigned to
the legislative and executive branches as long as there were no clearly
37
prescribed legal limits to the exercise of power by the other branches.
The efforts of legislatures and executives, especially Presidents, to
address the concerns, needs, and security of the people had to be
38
respected by judges in most cases.
Minton's attraction to judicial restraint was deeply rooted in
his experience as a senator when he vociferously objected to the
Supreme Court's frequent invalidations of critical pieces of Roosevelt's
New Deal legislation. Minton was elected to the Senate in 1934, and
in the following two years, the Supreme Court declared twelve major
pieces of legislation unconstitutional, effectively neutralizing most of
the New Deal. As a senator, Minton eagerly assumed a key role in
attacking the Court, and he was one of the most vocal supporters of
Roosevelt's ill-fated Court-packing scheme. In fact, before Roosevelt
introduced his plan, Minton proposed one of his own. His measure
would have required a majority of seven Justices, instead of five, to
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. 39 Minton first introduced
plaintiffs could not sue for damages when racial restrictive covenants were violated, id. at 25960.
37. For a good example of Minton's deferential policy of judicial review, see United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), discussed below.
38. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (upholding a New York law that
barred anyone who supported the overthrow of the government by force from state employment).
Adler is discussed at length below.
39. Dean Dinwoodey, Congress Awaits Next Court Move: Any Attempt to Curb Tribunal May
Depend on Labor and Security Act Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1937, at 65. There had been
earlier calls for a similar restriction on the Court. Senator William E. Borah of Idaho had
introduced a bill in 1923 that would have required a seven-vote majority to declare an act of
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his plan in a speech before the Federal Bar Association, which
consisted of attorneys employed by the federal government. He said
that "such regulation by Congress is logical and consistent with the
mechanics of checks and balances and the philosophy upon which our
form of government is constructed." He questioned whether it was
"wise to place in the hands of five of nine men that constitute the
Court, the absolute power to veto an act of Congress." 40 He noted
several examples in which the Constitution requires an extraordinary
majority to take action, including veto overrides, impeachment, and
treaty ratification.
Before Minton formally introduced his bill, Roosevelt submitted
his Court-packing scheme. The President proposed to expand the size
of the Supreme Court for every Justice over the age of seventy, thus
giving himself an opportunity to appoint several new Justices who
would be more receptive to his policies. Minton subsequently
abandoned his plan and fell in line supporting the President's
proposal. One of the diehards to defend the plan to the bitter end,
Minton was convinced that the Court had to be reined in, and if the
Court would not do so itself, then it was up to Congress. In fact,
Minton scoffed at the label of "Court-packing." He argued that the
41
Justices who refused to retire were the ones "packing" the Court. Of
course, the scheme met with vehement opposition from Congress and
from the larger public, but the idea of a limited judiciary remained an
article of faith to Minton. One of Minton's former law clerks on the
U.S. Supreme Court, Abner Mikva, who later became Chief Judge on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, maintains that
Minton's legislative experiences "did more to mold [Minton's] judicial
'
philosophy than anything else in his career. "42
Shortly after Minton lost his Senate seat in 1940, he was
appointed by Roosevelt to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. There
he had an opportunity to apply his philosophy of judicial restraint.
After taking his seat in 1941, Minton devoted the next eight years to
practicing judicial restraint. Given the nature of the cases before the
Seventh Circuit, the most common way he practiced his philosophy of
Congress unconstitutional, and the House of Representatives once passed a bill to require a twothirds majority.
40. Sherman Minton, Speech to the Federal Bar Association at Their Sixteenth Annual
Dinner at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C. 5 (Mar. 4, 1936) (on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review and original available at the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington,
Indiana).
41.

GUGIN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 25 at 109.

42. Abner J. Mikva, Lecture on the 100th Anniversary of Minton's Birth at Indiana
Southeast University: Sherman Minton: The Supreme Court Years 1 (Oct. 14, 1990) (on file with
the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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judicial restraint was the manner in which he interpreted
congressional statutes to determine how they should be implemented.
In one case, he dissented from the majority opinion because he
thought it had ignored the wording of the controlling statute. Minton
said:
[The law] is plain and unambiguous, and the words eliminated by the majority are
purposeful and full of meaning. As I understand it, it is not the business of courts to
seek conflicts or ambiguities in statutes in order that we may rewrite a statute to our
liking. It is our business to apply the statute as written ....43

On occasion, his strict interpretation of legislative language led
Minton to uphold the power of government over the claimed rights of
individuals while he was on the Seventh Circuit. One such case
involved a German enemy alien whose deportation had been ordered
by Attorney General Tom C. Clark because he was a threat to the
public peace and safety. 44 The individual claimed he had been denied
due process of law, but he lost his case before the district court. When
the case was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, Minton sided with the
district court and the attorney general. He declared that the only
question before the court was whether the petitioner was an enemy
alien, and "if he is, that ends the proceeding." 45 Minton said it was not
for the court to decide whether "the country from whence he came is
still at war with the United States or is still in existence as a
sovereign power; that is the political question to be answered only by.
. . the executive and legislative branches." 46 Minton thought the
executive branch not only was more competent to decide this issue but
clearly had the power to decide this type of question. The circuit court
opinion foreshadowed how Minton would handle questions of statutory
construction on the Supreme Court-as a strict constructionist with a
strong deference to legislative and executive power. While his steady
adherence to judicial restraint sometimes came at the expense of
individual rights, that was not always the case. Instead, "his
consistent adherence to judicial restraint caused him to rule both for
and against business, for and against labor, for and against the rights
of individuals. His rulings were as likely to displease liberals as
conservatives." 47 Whatever the shortcomings of judicial restraint
might be, Minton applied it about as faithfully, and some might say as
rigidly, as anyone on the Court at that time or since.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Adler v. N. Hotel Co., 175 F.2d 619, 622-23 (7th Cir. 1942).
United States ex rel. Hack v. Clark, 159 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1947).
Id. at 554.
Id.
GUGIN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 25, at 209.
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B. On the Court
Minton was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court by President
Truman in 1949, following the death of Wiley B. Rutledge. He was
Truman's fourth and last appointment to the Court. Significantly, he
was the last member of Congress as well as the last New Dealer to be
seated on the Court. Although his appointment was seen by many as
an act of cronyism driven by partisan politics, this view ignores
Minton's qualifications. For eight years he had proven himself as an
appellate court judge and earned a reputation for being a hard worker.
The volume of his opinions matched that of his colleagues, and he was
recognized by those both on and off the appellate court for his
adeptness in distilling complex, technical issues into comprehensible
dimensions. Further, at the time he was nominated, he had more
formal training in the law than any sitting member of the Court,
having obtained a Master's in Law from Yale University School of
Law.
The Court that Minton joined was made up mostly of New
Dealers, including Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H.
Jackson, Stanley F. Reed, William 0. Douglas, Chief Justice Fred M.
Vinson, and Tom Clark. The one exception was Harold H. Burton, a
former Republican Senator who was Truman's first appointment to
the Court. Despite the New Deal background of most of the Justices,
they did not share a common judicial philosophy. Two factions existed
on the Court. One was led by Black and Douglas, whose absolutist
views of the First Amendment reflected the substantive due process
theory; they favored judicial intervention to protect civil liberties and
civil rights. The other faction included Frankfurter and Jackson, the
Court's leading judicial-restraint philosophers. Frankfurter and
Jackson promoted a balancing theory of rights that was consistent
with the process theory of jurisprudence. That approach stressed the
necessity of self-restraint on the part of Justices and relied on certain
principles to limit and guide the Court in accepting and deciding
cases. Among these principles was a requirement that the Court
establish "preliminary classifications of controversies as unsuitable for
'judicial,' 'legislative,' 'executive' and 'administrative' decisions and
their consequent allocation to the appropriate branches of
government, with the judiciary recognizing its own limited
jurisdiction." 48 Minton's views fit perfectly into this philosophical
framework.

48.

WHITE, supranote 26, at 273.
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All of the Truman appointees were adherents of judicial
restraint. Frequently joining this camp were Justices Jackson and
Reed. Minton was closest to Chief Justice Vinson both philosophically
and personally. His ascension to the Court assured Vinson of the
majority he needed to move the Court away from its emerging role as
a defender of individual rights over the government's interests in
order and security, and toward a more process-oriented view of cases.
Vinson's death in 1953 laid the foundation for a new direction for the
Court, one that emphasized an "increasingly broad definition of rights
attaching to American citizenship." 49 For Minton, this was a doubleedged sword. To the extent that the Warren Court favored expanding
rights for those disadvantaged by racial discrimination, Minton easily
became a team player. However, when the expansion of rights came at
the expense of governmental interests in the areas of public safety and
security, Minton was increasingly at odds with the majority. Minton
found himself more isolated as the Court became more activist. The
situation was difficult for a Justice who was once described as having
"elevated judicial restraint to a new high. '50
The strain of fighting the tide of activism plus the toll taken by
his poor health led Minton to retire from the Court. He wrote Truman
a letter midway through his last Term on the Court explaining his
decision to retire: "I am slipping fast," he said. "I find my work very
difficult and I don't have the zest for the work I used to have." 5 1 He
said that the pernicious anemia he had had for ten years "[had]
sapped [his] vitality, especially mental."5 2 Minton's replacement by
William Brennan was highly symbolic of the tide of activism
overtaking the Court. Brennan was instrumental in leading the Court
toward a more activist approach on critical issues. One of the Court's
most restrained Justices was replaced by one of the most activist, and
the trend toward activism has continued ever since. The Warren
Court, the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court all pushed the
Court toward a more intrusive role in the political system.
The Rehnquist Court in particular was noted for asserting a
more aggressive role for the Court in resolving critical constitutional
issues. That Court was divided between those who espoused the
"originalist approach" to constitutional interpretation and those who
advocated the "living Constitution" approach. Although both of these

49. Id. at 268.
50. GUGIN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 25, at 270.
51. Letter from Sherman Minton to Harry Truman (Dec. 27, 1955) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
52. Id.
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approaches posit very different standards, neither view, as White
notes, "is centered on the institutional considerations related to the
counter-majoritarian difficulty. . . . [B]oth are capable of being
radically activist. Neither is necessarily supportive of the canon of
53
deference to other branch actors."
This trend of judicial activism that has continued since
Minton's departure from the Court makes him perhaps the last
Justice to cling to judicial restraint despite the criticism it invited
from a significant segment of the influential members of the scholarly
community and even the mainstream media. It might be argued that
John Marshall Harlan II, with whom Minton served briefly on the
Warren Court, deserves the distinction as the last true advocate of
judicial restraint. He clearly had a well-reasoned philosophy that led
him to dissent against the excesses of the Warren Court's expansion of
individual rights. But unlike Minton-who rarely could be accused of
caring whether the outcome of a decision satisfied liberal or
conservative values-Harlan's dissents bore an ideological tinge that
was distinctly conservative. His disposition "represented a blending of
standard caveats about the unrestricted exercise of judicial power that
had characterized one strand of twentieth-century jurisprudence since
54
Holmes, and his own personal suspicions of substantive liberalism."
Minton's lack of partisanship on the bench did little to increase the
esteem in which judicial scholars held him or to affect their judgment
that he was a failure as a Justice. Interestingly, other Justices with a
more partisan bent than Minton-Douglas, for example-have not
been relegated to the "failure" category.

III. A PRINCIPLED JUSTICE
Minton's nonideological approach to judicial decisionmaking
was the result of three guiding principles: an almost unbending
adherence to precedents, deference to the elected branches of
government, and a literal interpretation of the Constitution and
statutes. On occasion he might have deviated from these principles
when he thought it necessary, but his overall record of decisionmaking
and opinion writing was faithful to them.

53.
54.

WHITE, supranote 26, at xix.
Id. at 291.
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A. A Commitment to Precedents
Minton attributed his reverence to precedents to the influence
of William Howard Taft, one of his law professors at Yale who later
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Minton described Taft as
being of the "bird dog" school regarding precedents. Taft's advice was
to "find what the Court has said-get a 'hog' case and stick to it."55
Minton acknowledged that perhaps his training was "too much in that
school."5 6 Minton's opinions indicate that he took Taft's advice to
heart. One Minton biographer, David Atkinson, observed that "the
degree of [Minton's] dependence on precedent.
set him apart from
57
most of his colleagues."
Reliance on precedents is one of the hallmarks of Minton's
opinions. This principle was not limited to one particular area of the
law. He applied it in cases relating to national security, criminal
procedure, minority rights, and interstate commerce. Minton's
consistency in applying stare decisis was not related to any specific
desired outcome that might have fit his personal ideological
preferences. This consistency is very apparent in one of his most
controversial cases, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.5 8
Ellen Knauff, a German war bride, was denied entry to the United
States in 1948 because the Immigration and Naturalization Service
considered her presence in the country to be "prejudicial to the
interests of the United States." 59 She was given no notice nor afforded
an opportunity for a hearing prior to being denied entry. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service relied on an administrative
regulation issued by the attorney general that allowed aliens to be
excluded without a hearing. The attorney general acted pursuant to a
congressional statute that authorized the President to establish
"reasonable rules, regulations and orders" pertaining to the entrance
of aliens during periods of national emergency. 60 Petitioning the
Court, Knauff argued that the rule as applied in this case was not
reasonable in view of the War Brides Act of 1945, by which Congress
made it easier for wives of soldiers to enter the country as long as they

55. Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 18, 1960) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
56. Id.
57. David N. Atkinson, From New Deal Liberal to Supreme Court Conservative: The
Metamorphosis of Justice Sherman Minton, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 361, 385-86.
58. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
59. Id. at 540.
60. Id. at 541.
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were "otherwise admissible under the immigration laws." 6 1 Knauff
argued that the administrative regulations that barred her entry
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power
and were therefore void.
Speaking for the Court's majority, Minton dismissed these
claims. His opinion followed three of his most consistent practicesheavy reliance on precedents, deference to the authority of Congress
and the executive branch, and emphasis on statutory interpretationto resolve the issue. Minton duly noted precedents stipulating that
aliens who seek admission to the United States may not do so under
any claim of right. Rather, admission for aliens is a "privilege granted
by the sovereign United States," he said, and it must be granted "in
accordance with procedures that the United States provides." 62 Minton
also used precedent to justify the delegation of power: "[T]here is no
question of inappropriate delegation of legislative power involved
here. The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The
right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the United
States."63 This reasoning is consistent with Minton's intent to preserve
the delineation of powers as laid out in the Constitution.
Having established the legitimacy of the executive to exclude
an alien, Minton explained the necessity of judicial deference to
legislative and executive authority. The ruling of the attorney general
was "final and conclusive," he said, and "whatever the rule may be
concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry into the
United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless
expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the
political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien."64
Knauff contended, and Minton rejected, that the War Brides
Act required a hearing in her case because Congress intended that the
special restrictions on the entry of aliens not be applied to war brides
upon cessation of hostilities. She insisted that the President had, in
fact, proclaimed an end to hostilities. Minton's construction of the War
Brides Act was that the time frame in question was only for
ascertaining the period in which the citizens must have served in the
armed services for their spouses and children to be entitled to the
benefits of the Act. Further, Minton cited precedent to confirm that a

61. Id. at 546
62. Id. at 542.
63. Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) and Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)).
64. Id. at 543.
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state of war still existed at the time, and therefore the President's
proclamation and the regulations were still valid under immigration
law.
Minton dismissed the possibility of a conflict between the
immigration statutes and the War Brides Act. He found nothing in the
wording or history of the Act to indicate that Congress intended
to relax the security provisions of the immigration laws ... [nor] to permit members or
former members of the armed forces to marry and bring into the United States aliens
who the President [or his Attorney General]... found should be denied entry for
65
security reasons.

In his view, Congress was not compelled to spell out a specific formula
to guide administrative decisionmaking in an area in which flexibility
is needed. Drawing on two precedents, Minton said that "standards
prescribed by Congress are to be read in the light of the conditions to
which they are to be applied .... Whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
66
concerned."
Frankfurter wrote a strong dissenting opinion in which he
chided Minton for his literal reading of the law. "The letter Killeth," he
wrote, and "legislation should not be read in such a decimating spirit
unless the letter of Congress is inexorable. ' 67 Rather than placing
emphasis on the status of admission to the country as a "privilege,"
completely dependent upon the judgment of the executive,
Frankfurter interpreted the intent of Congress as emphasizing the
high regard that American society placed upon the family. He believed
that the benefit was extended not so much to the alien but to the
American husband, and having extended the benefit, Congress would
not have allowed the privilege to be arbitrarily taken away. Minton
would have required Congress actually to state such an intention. He
would not read into the law a more desirable outcome to satisfy some
personal preference.
Minton's reliance on stare decisis did not always result in the
deprivation of rights. On one occasion, Minton artfully relied on a
precedent to create other rights. Barrows v. Jackson68 was in response
to a loophole that resulted from the Court's 1948 decision in Shelley v.
Kraemer, which held that state enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants amounts to discrimination and thus violates the Fourteenth

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 547.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 548 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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Amendment. 69 Because the ruling limited only the enforcement by
state courts, restrictive covenants were still legal, and those who
entered into them could still sue violators for damages. Barrows
involved such a suit. A white property owner sued another white
property owner for violating the terms of the covenant by selling her
property to a non-Caucasian. The first issue to be addressed was
whether state courts could award damages in such cases. Minton
concluded that they could not because it would constitute state action
depriving non-Caucasians of equal protection of the law. The real crux
of the case, however, was the issue of standing, since no nonCaucasian was directly before the Court claiming deprivation of a
constitutional right. This question presented something of a dilemma
for Minton because of precedents that "ordinarily preclude[d] a person
from challenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the
rights of others." 70 Before a person could challenge the
constitutionality of a statute, he had to show that "he himself is
injured by its operation." 71 Minton, who generally was sympathetic to
issues of racial discrimination, determined that the need to protect the
fundamental rights of non-Caucasians outweighed the Court's
traditional practice regarding standing.
The way out of the dilemma was another precedent that could
be used to support standing in this case. The 1925 case of Pierce v.
Society of Sisters72 allowed private schools to challenge an Oregon law
requiring all parents to send their children to public schools as a
violation of the parents' constitutional rights. Although no parent
affected by the statute sought redress from the Court, the schools were
granted standing to assert their constitutional rights. Minton found
Pierce to be analogous to Barrows. Minton thought that unless the
litigant being sued was allowed to assert the rights of non-Caucasians
who were not parties to the dispute, fundamental rights protected by
the Constitution would be denied. However, concern about the possible
expansiveness of his ruling led Minton to limit its application by
reaffirming the Court's 'longstanding general practice of denying
standing to those seeking to assert constitutional rights of third
parties. What distinguished this case was its "unique situation,"
wherein the action of the state court might result in the denial of
constitutional rights, making it impossible for third parties to assert
their. grievance before any court.

69. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1948).
70. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255.
71. Id.
72. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Minton's skill in handling the issues in Barrows is almost
never mentioned in the various contemporary assessments of his
performance, but at the time, he was praised in law review articles
and by his fellow Justices. 73 Burton called it a "difficult constructive
job admirably done"; Black, who had assigned the opinion to him,
called it a "firm, forthright opinion"; and Frankfurter wrote that it was
74
a "true, lawyer-like job."
Although Minton generally was not disposed to dissent, he did
not hesitate to do so when he thought the majority had misread
precedents. On occasion, he dissented from the majority's
interpretation of precedent in antitrust cases. While on the Seventh
Circuit, Minton developed a reputation for interpreting the Sherman
Act and other antitrust legislation broadly, showing deference to
congressional legislation, and upholding most forms of government
regulation of business. 75 Monopolistic practices were especially suspect
in his eyes. As an appellate judge, he wrote such a disproportionate
number of opinions in this area that United States Law Week
described antitrust legislation as the primary emphasis of his eight76
year tenure on the circuit court.
On the Supreme Court, Minton generally followed this pattern
of broad application of antitrust regulations. He usually joined the
majority in holding antitrust laws applicable to various business
practices. 77 On occasion, however, he interpreted antitrust regulations
narrowly. In 1922, in Federal Baseball Club v. National League,78 the
Court had ruled that baseball competitions were not commerce.
Therefore they were purely a state matter and exempt from federal
antitrust law. Minton, who shared a keen interest in baseball with
other members of the Court, including Chief Justices Vinson and
Warren, was in complete agreement when the Court reaffirmed, in a
73. Comment, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), 1953 WASH. U. L.Q. 439, 442;
Recent Case, Vendor May Defend Damage Action for Breach of Restrictive Covenant by Raising
ConstitutionalRights of Non-Caucasian Vendees, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 134, 136 (1953).
74. Letter from Hugo Black to Sherman Minton (May 29, 1953) (on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review); Letter from Harold Burton to Sherman Minton (May 18, 1953) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton (May 16, 1953) (on
file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
75. For a discussion of Minton's opinions about economic regulation on the Seventh Circuit,
see GUGIN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 25, at 185-98.
76. FourthTruman Appointee Confirmed, 18 U.S. L. WK. 3097, 3097 (1949).
77. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1954) (applying
antitrust regulations to a bread seller's practice of cutting prices in intrastate transactions but
maintaining prices in interstate transactions); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.,
339 U.S. 485, 489-92 (1950) (holding that the Sherman Act applied to price fixing of real estate
agent commission rates even where no interstate commerce was involved).
78. 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
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per curiam decision, baseball's exemption from interstate commerce in
1953. 79 However, two years later he disagreed when the Court refused
to grant professional boxing the same exemption. He cited the two
baseball precedents jn which the Court held that "'personal effort,' not
related to production, is not a subject of commerce . . . and since the
baseball game was an exhibition wholly intrastate, there could be no
trade or commerce among the states."8 0 The travel from one state to
another to play the game was considered to be incident to the
exhibition. Minton did not see the factual difference between baseball
and boxing. He said:
When boxers travel from State to State, carrying their shorts and fancy dressing robes
in a ditty bag in order to participate in a boxing bout, which is wholly intrastate, it is
now held by this Court that the boxing bout becomes interstate commerce. What this
Court held in the Federal Baseball case to be incident to the exhibition now becomes
more important than the exhibition.
This is as fine an example of the tail wagging the
81
dog as can be conjured up.

Minton also dissented in a case about practices of a local
plasterers association that was charged by the federal government for
restraint of trade.8 2 The majority thought that the practices of the
local association, which controlled about seventy percent of the
contracting business for plastering in Chicago, were restraining trade
because they prevented out-of-state contractors from doing business in
the Chicago area. The Court's majority determined that the plasterers'
activities affected interstate commerce because a significant
proportion of the materials used by the plasterers came from other
states. Minton, however, was not convinced. He attacked the
precedents cited by the majority as not being analogous to the
plasterers' case. To support his own opinion, he pointed to the rulings
in Federal Baseball and Toolson: "Contracting to plaster a building in
Chicago by an outstate contractor is not commerce, even if the
contractor did intend to bring his men from outstate, any more than
bringing men from one state to another to play baseball is
commerce."8 3 Minton agreed that the flow of materials into the state
constituted commerce, but he reasoned that plastering a building was
purely local and thus not subject to federal regulation.
Minton's heavy reliance on precedent was consistent with his
conception of the limited role of the Court. To him, this had the virtue
of guaranteeing certainty and predictability in the law. This
79. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953).
80. United States v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. 348 U.S. 236, 251 (1955)
81. Id.
82. United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1954).
83. Id. at 196.
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commitment to prior decisions, of course, clashed with "judicial
innovation. '8 4 Minton, however, did not think that it was the Court's
role to bring about change. He clearly thought that these were the
prerogatives of the elected branches of government.
B. Deference to Other Branches
Minton's penchant for hewing strictly to precedents paralleled
his adamant deference to the legislative and executive branches.
These two facets of his judicial approach are inextricably intertwined
because deference to the other branches is a central tenet of judicial
restraint. A former law clerk put it succinctly; he said that when it
came to lines of authority regarding the legislative and executive
branches, Minton "was inclined to feel that a court had no role to play
other than to sustain the authority of the other two branches of
government."8 5 Minton's experience as a New Dealer had convinced
him that his primary obligation as a judge was to sustain the elected
branches of government as long as they had the power to act. It was
not up to judges to question the wisdom of these decisions so long as
they did not violate clearly stated legal limits on their power.
Perhaps no area of the law better illustrates his insistence on
judicial deference than national security. During Minton's tenure, the
Court was confronted with some of the most difficult challenges it ever
has faced. Cases involving threats to national security were
particularly vexing for the Court because of the ideological rifts among
the Justices about the appropriate weight that should be given to the
government's concern with order, security, and the rights of citizens.
For "absolutists" like Black and Douglas, the answer was simple: the
First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, and free association took
precedence over any other considerations. The other camp, led by
Frankfurter, rejected such a rigid stance and instead preferred to
resolve the issues using a balancing test, which required a case-bycase weighing of the competing interests of the individual and the
interests of the state in preserving order, security, and stability. This
is the approach that Minton followed, although in most of his cases the
balance weighed in favor of the government rather than the
individual. This tendency was aptly illustrated in the Knauff opinion
discussed above. To Minton, the procedures prescribed by Congress
and the President outweighed the injustice to the war bride Knauff.

84. WHITE, supra note 26, at 471.
85. David N. Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty, 50 IND. L.J. 34,
34 (1974).
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Two cases that illustrate Minton's deferential posture on issues
of national security involved Eugene Dennis and other leaders of the
U.S. Communist Party who were accused of conspiracy against the
U.S. government. Minton wrote the first Dennis opinion,8 6 and Chief
87
Justice Vinson wrote the second and more famous opinion of the two.
The first case concerned an appeal by Dennis of a conviction for failing
to respond to a subpoena from the House Un-American Activities
Committee ("HUAC"), which investigated Communist activities.
Dennis challenged his conviction because seven members of the jury
were government employees, and as such, were subject to government
loyalty programs under which they could be discharged for disloyalty
to the government. Therefore, Dennis argued, they were biased
against him.
Minton, writing for the majority, concluded that government
loyalty programs were not sufficient grounds for disqualifying jurors
in a trial. He based his opinion squarely on both his interpretation of a
1935 congressional statute that stipulated government employees
generally were eligible for jury duty except for "certain cases," and two
precedents that had sustained the constitutionality of that law.
Refusing to look beyond the record of the case, Minton said that the
Court was being asked to exempt jurors because of "implied," rather
than "actual," bias. His literal reading of the statute was that
Congress made no exception for such circumstances when it declared
that all persons, regardless of government employment, "shall be
qualified to serve as jurors in the District of Columbia and shall not be
exempt from service."8 8 Minton acknowledged that a defendant
belonging to an unpopular minority group "must be accorded that
solicitude which properly accompanies an accused person, [but] he is
not entitled to unusual protection."8 9 Although he was unwilling to
look beyond the record in the case, he acknowledged in his private
correspondence that "Dennis was really being tried for being a
communist" 90 and not for refusing to appear, but even so, Minton was
not persuaded to treat the defendants differently. There was no
question in Minton's mind that the statute was "within the power of
Congress," and consequently, federal employees could not be
challenged solely because of their employment.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
States).

Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Dennis, 339 U.S. at 171-72.
Id. at 168.
Atkinson, supra note 25, at 288 (citing Sherman Minton's file on Dennis v. United
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The two dissents in the case were by Black and Frankfurter,
both of whom challenged Minton's reliance on precedent-Black
because he thought Minton had misapplied the precedent and
Frankfurter because he thought Minton had enlarged the meaning of
it. Both Justices noted that the two precedents dealt with entirely
different types of cases, neither having to do with government loyalty
programs in times fraught with fear and paranoia.
The second Dennis case, the most noted of the Communist
conspiracy cases, followed quickly on the heels of the first one. In
1951, the Court heard Communist Party leaders' appeal of their
convictions under the Smith Act for advocating the violent overthrow
of the government. They challenged the government action on two
grounds: that their freedom of speech had been violated and that the
conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act were unconstitutional. Chief
Justice Vinson's majority opinion relied on his interpretation of the
"clear and present danger" test adopted by the Court in Schenck v.
United States.91 The Court rendered a new interpretation of the test
based on the "gravity of evil" standard enunciated by Judge Learned
Hand in his circuit court opinion that upheld the convictions of the
Communist Party leaders. 92 Vinson appropriated Hand's language in
his own opinion when he wrote that courts must weigh "whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech." 93 Vinson believed that that order was the
primary value to be protected, for without that there could be no
freedom. He wrote that "if a society cannot protect its very structure
from armed attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be
protected. [Government need not] wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid, and the signal awaited. '94 Minton
concurred completely with Vinson's reasoning, and his legislative
background was no doubt a factor. As a senator he had voted for the
Smith Act, which outlawed advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching
the violent overthrow of the government, as well as organizing or
knowingly joining an organization that conspired to overthrow the
government. His support for the Smith Act in 1940 indicated that he
thought national security concerns had to take precedence over
individual rights when the country was faced with the possibility of
war. By 1951, in the face of a perceived Communist threat, Minton
had not changed his mind.

91. 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919).
92. Dennis v. United States 183 F.2d 201, 211-212 (2d Cir. 1950)
93. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
94. Id. at 509.
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National security was also a prime concern of state
governments, and Minton accorded their policies the same deference
that he afforded Congress. Loyalty oaths similar to the one
promulgated by the federal government commonly were used by states
under their police powers. In Adler v. Board of Education of the City of
New York, Minton wrote for the majority of the Court in upholding the
constitutionality of a New York state law that barred from
employment persons belonging to subversive organizations. 95 Under
the state's Feinberg Law, membership in any organization listed as
subversive by the state was prima facie evidence of unsuitability for
any position within the public school system. Petitioners challenged
the law as a violation of their First Amendment rights of free speech
and association as well as their Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
due process. Minton summarily dismissed these claims by asserting
that the state had not deprived the petitioners of any constitutional
right. They remained free to advocate and to associate. They did not,
however, have a guaranteed right to "work for the State in the school
system on their own terms."96 Rather, Minton reasoned that the state
had a "vital concern . . . to preserve the integrity of the schools,"

particularly because of the unique nature of education. 97 "A teacher
works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the
attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live ...and
[therefore] the state may very properly inquire into the company they
98
keep."
Issues of deference in cases of national security were not
always as clear-cut, however. The landmark case of Youngstown Sheet
and Tube v. Sawyer is an example. 99 In response to a threatened
strike by steel workers in 1950 in the midst of the Korean War,
President Truman ordered Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to
seize the nation's steel mills to keep them operating. Truman based
his order on his "inherent powers" as commander-in-chief. He
specifically rejected utilizing another possible source of powerlegislative authority under the Taft-Hartley law that granted the
President the power to issue an injunction stopping the strike and
forcing the steel workers back to work. The steel companies sued to
prevent the takeover, and in fairly short order, the case reached the
Supreme Court. The Court was called upon to address the significant

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id. at 493.
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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constitutional question of whether the President has inherent power
to seize private property for the purpose of defending the security of
the country in wartime.
Normally, Minton could have resolved such an issue by relying
on the separation-of-powers doctrine, but in this case it was not so
simple. The lines of authority regarding the President's war powers
were not delineated so clearly. Minton, who had a strong bent for
simplifying complex issues, resolved the dilemma by taking a
pragmatic approach. He was concerned about the practical
consequences of not supporting the President in the midst of a war, so
he, along with Vinson and Reed, voted to uphold the President's
authority. He was adamant during the conference discussion that
"there [be] no vacant spot in power when the security of the nation is
at stake ... the power is the power of defense and it rests with the
President."1 00
The Justices in the majority cited legislative power and specific
acts of Congress as limits on the President's authority. Black, who
wrote the majority opinion, took the absolutist position that, under the
separation of powers, the authority to seize private property is a
legislative power, and in the absence of legislative action delegating
such authority to the President, he lacked the power. Every member of
the six-man majority wrote a separate opinion, each with varying
views about the extent of the President's power to act in such
situations. Each found a legislative limit on Truman's authority to
order the seizure of the steel mills.
Arriving at his decision to support the President required that
Minton reject the arguments of the majority regarding legislative
limits on the President's power to seize private property for reasons of
national security. He readily subscribed to Chief Justice Vinson's
dissenting argument that the President was required to act to prevent
the "disastrous effect" that would result from interruption of steel
production. There is no evidence that Minton ever had second
thoughts about siding with the President and against Congress, the
institution in which he had served. Years later, he defended his vote
in Youngstown because he "believed that the government had the
right to defend itself in an emergency." 10 1 He said, "The Korean War
was on and I could not think of anything worse than the men on the

100. William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (May
16, 1952) (unpublished notes, on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
101. Howard Bray, Justice Is Proud of School Ruling, LOUISVILLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1956, at 1
(on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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firing line reaching back for munitions that weren't there."1 0 2 When
Minton's principle of judicial deference was put to the test, he chose
the President over Congress, at least in the circumstances presented
in Youngstown. Whether he would have been inclined to do so in other
circumstances is impossible to answer.
Deference to other branches of government was the cornerstone
of Minton's judicial restraint philosophy. He was averse to
invalidating legislative and executive decisions unless there was a
clear prohibition in the Constitution. This deferential stance was
especially noticeable in cases involving national security issues, and
this bent meant, more often than not, upholding government over
individual rights.
C. Reliance on Strict Interpretation
Some of the thorniest questions confronting the Court during
Minton's tenure were those involving individual rights, especially the
rights of defendants in both federal and state trials and the
Fourteenth Amendment requirement that states guarantee equal
protection of the law to all citizens. Minton relied on a literal
interpretation of the Constitution and narrowly interpreted
constitutional guarantees for defendants, giving more leeway to law
enforcement officials. This tendency was a continuation of the stance
he took when interpreting defendants' rights on the Seventh Circuit.
Minton's disposition on rights of defendants in criminal proceedings
corresponded to the concept of "fair-trial jurisprudence," which
determines a defendant's rights on a case-by-case basis rather than
extending rights across the board. 10 3 As he explained in one opinion,
the requirements of due process were not a fixed concept: "As in all
cases involving what is and is not due process," he said, "no hard and.
fast rule can be laid down. The pattern of due process is picked out in
the facts and circumstances of each case." 10 4 In adhering to fair-trial
jurisprudence, Minton did not think it was necessary to read into due
process requirements additional rights just because they might
produce a different result for the defendant. If he determined that the
challenged piece of evidence or procedure did not materially affect the
outcome of the trial, Minton would uphold the trial results, despite the
claim. In one opinion, he argued that the record shrieked of the
102. Id.
103. See DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY

99 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) ("[T]he fair trial test meant that the Court would decide case by
case which rights of the accused enjoyed constitutional protection.").
104. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1953).
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defendant's guilt and that it was inconceivable that "this one
admission could have possibly influenced this jury to reach an
improper verdict. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a
105
perfect one."
Minton's opinion in United States v. Rabinowitz10 6 is
illustrative of his approach in criminal cases. The petitioner, a stamp
dealer who forged overprints of postage stamps, claimed that his
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated when he was convicted on the basis of evidence
taken from his office without a search warrant. The search was
conducted incident to his arrest, and Minton argued in his opinion
that it was undisputed that searches without a warrant but incident
to a valid arrest were permissible. "[S]uch searches," he wrote, "turn
upon the reasonableness under all the circumstances and not upon the
practicability of procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is not
required."'1 7 Among the circumstances that Minton thought relevant
were that the office was small and the search was confined to the room
in the office that was used for unlawful purposes. He claimed that
"[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable."'' 0 8 In Minton's mind,
Rabinowitz applied a strict interpretation of the Constitution, which
"does not define what are 'unreasonable searches' and, regrettably, in
our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test."10 9 In the absence of
a clear definition of what makes a search reasonable, Minton erred on
the side of practicality. He thought it was "fallacious to judge events
retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the time element
alone, that there was time to procure a search warrant. . .. Some
flexibility will be accorded law officers engaged in daily battle with
criminals." 10 He did not think the Constitution could be read to
require more. Minton's position on the reasonableness of obtaining a
warrant subject to arrest prevailed until 1969, when it was overturned
in Chimel v. California."'
Although the Rabinowitz ruling drew its share of critics, there
were those who also found merit in the opinion. One law review article
cited Rabinowitz as an example of Minton's ability to write an
excellent, informative opinion. "This is honest, good opinion writing,"
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 65.
395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
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one wrote. 1 12 Another said that even though the opinion overruled an
earlier opinion on searches and seizures, it did so "with great care and
13
precision."
Another example of Minton's strict interpretation of the
Constitution is reflected in his views of what constituted "state action"
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. When Minton was
convinced that discrimination resulted from state action, he did not
hesitate to rule against it. Out of the sixteen cases involving racial
discrimination while Minton was on the Court, he ruled in favor of the
minority claimant thirteen times." 4 His opinion in Barrows
demonstrates his determination that state courts could not be used to
allow suits against those who violated restrictive housing covenants.
There certainly was never any doubt in Minton's mind that the Equal
Protection Clause did not permit states to maintain segregated
schools. When the case of Brown v. Board of Education1 5 first reached
the Supreme Court in 1952, he unhesitatingly joined with Black,
Douglas, and Burton after the first round of oral arguments in calling
for an end to segregation. 116 Minton argued adamantly in conference
that "classification by race is not reasonable [and] segregation [is] per
se unconstitutional."1 7 Minton maintained that position throughout
the Court's two-year consideration of the Brown case. After retiring he
described his participation in the Brown case as his single most
8
important contribution to the Court."
Even though Minton was an ardent advocate of equal rights,
his strict interpretation of the Constitution sometimes landed him on
the other side of the issue. Despite his strong opposition to
discrimination based on race, Minton could not bring himself to read
the Constitution as prohibiting private discrimination. This view was
vividly illustrated by his dissent in the Jaybird case, in which the
Court invalidated a preprimary election by the Jaybird Association, an
all-white organization whose winners were placed on the Democratic
Party ballot in the regular primary. Even though the Jaybird

112. George D. Braden, Mr. Justice Minton and the Truman Bloc, 26 IND. L.J. 153, 155
(1951).
113. John P. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 52
(1950).

114. Hull, supra note 25, at 196.
115. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
116. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 613 (1976).
117. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 287 (1993).

118. See Bray, supra note 101, at 1 (quoting Minton that Brown v. Board of Education was
"the most important decision of the century because of its impact on our whole way of life").
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Association was a private organization, a majority of the Court held
that its actions constituted state action under the Fifteenth
Amendment, which prohibits a state from denying voting rights on the
basis of race. Minton's dissent vehemently challenged the Court's
opinion that actions by the Jaybird Association were the equivalent of
state action. He wrote:
I am not concerned in the least as to what happens to the Jaybirds or their unworthy
scheme. I am concerned about what this Court says is state action within the meaning
of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution. For, after all, this Court has1 power
to
19
redress a wrong under that Amendment only if the wrong is done by the State.

The strength of Minton's conviction on this issue was revealed in a
later exchange with Justice Jackson, who had sent Minton a bar
association article speculating that the Supreme Court might be
following election returns. In an uncharacteristically sharp response,
Minton told Jackson that "[w]hen the Jaybird opinion comes down,
there may be some question as to which election returns the Court
follows! It will be damn clear they are not following on law. 1 2 °
The Jaybird case illustrates a characteristic observed by
virtually all who have studied Minton's opinions in depth: he never
changed his views to suit others or to bring about results that he
personally might have preferred. After Minton retired from the Court,
Justice Black wrote to him about his tenacity in the Jaybird case.
Black said that Minton never was afraid "to follow that hard course if
your honest judgment told you that was right." Further, Black said he
could not recall a single case "where you lowered your flag because of
'' 12 1
any effect your decision might have on Shay Minton.
Minton's dissent in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Howard122 further demonstrates the consistency in his interpretation
of what constituted state action. The case involved an all-white union
for brakemen and a railroad company that had contracted to eliminate
positions held by black porters. The Brotherhood did not represent the
black porters whom it had refused to admit for membership, even
though they performed the same tasks as the brakemen. The porters
always had bargained separately with the company. Although this
was clearly racial discrimination, Minton considered it to be private
119. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484-85 (1953) (Minton, J., dissenting).
120. Letter from Sherman Minton to Robert Jackson (Mar. 28, 1953) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review and original available at the Lilly Library, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana).
121. Letter from Hugo Black to Sherman Minton (Dec. 22, 1959) (on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review and original available at the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington,
Indiana).
122. 343 U.S. 768, 775 (1952) (Minton, J., dissenting).
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action and, therefore, beyond the reach of the Constitution. Relying on
precedent and an interpretation of the Railroad Labor Act, the Court
invalidated the contract. Minton claimed the reason was not because
the porters were entitled to be represented by the Brotherhood.
Rather, he thought the only reason the Court invalidated the contract
was because the porters were black. Minton accused the majority of
reading more into the precedent and the statute than was justified
and converting "state action" into an open-ended concept. He
acknowledged that the Court had the "sheer power" to annul the
contract, but that was not "a substitute for legality."123 Minton
indicated his personal disapproval of the discrimination being carried
out, but he was unable to conclude that it constituted state action.
Minton's commitment to strictly interpreting the Constitution
carried over to legislative statutes. He sought to follow the language
and intent of Congress as closely as possible. Cases dealing with the
power of administrative agencies are illustrative of his strict
interpretation of statutes. Minton did not approve of reviewing agency
rulings unless Congress specifically provided for it. Although he
generally was disposed to show deference to administrative agencies,
his deference was conditioned upon his interpretation of the
authorizing statute. Thus, his strict interpretation of statutes was
closely intertwined with his deference to the will of Congress. If his
reading of the statute convinced him that Congress had intended to
authorize the disputed power, Minton inevitably would uphold the
agency's discretion. On the other hand, if the authorizing statute was
not clear, Minton would not defer to an agency's interpretation of the
statute because he thought that such interpretation was exclusively
the responsibility of the courts. Judicial competence trumped
administrative discretion.
Cases involving the regulation of natural gas are good
indicators of Minton's disposition toward the power of administrative
agencies. In the 1954 case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
Minton wrote the majority opinion upholding a broader jurisdiction for
the power of the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") than the
Commission wanted. 124 The case revolved around the interpretation of
the Natural Gas Act, which was passed in 1938 while Minton was still
in the Senate. The Act exempted from FPC jurisdiction the production
or gathering of natural gas. Phillips Petroleum produced, transmitted,
and subsequently sold natural gas to interstate pipeline companies
that then transmitted and resold the gas to consumers and local
123. Id. at 778.
124. 347 U.S. 672, 679 (1954).
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distributors. At issue in the Phillips case was whether the sales to the
interstate pipeline were subject to regulation by the FPC. Both the
Commission and Phillips claimed that they were not. The FPC
specifically asserted that it had no power to regulate the wholesale
price of natural gas. Wisconsin officials argued that the FPC did have
jurisdiction because the regulation of wholesale rates was a national,
not local, power.
Writing for the majority, Minton determined that Phillips's
sales to the pipeline companies were separate from its production and
gathering and therefore not exempt from FPC regulation. In so doing,
he helped to fill a loophole in the Natural Gas Act that would have
prevented the federal government from regulating wholesale prices of
gas. After carefully dissecting the history of the Act and numerous
Court rulings regarding regulation of natural gas, Minton concluded
that Congress intended to give the FPC jurisdiction over the wholesale
of natural gas in interstate commerce, regardless of whether the
wholesale occurred "before, during or after transmission by an
interstate pipeline company." 125 There was no doubt that the primary
legislative purpose of the Act was to "plug the 'gap' in regulation of
natural-gas companies resulting from judicial decisions prohibiting, on
federal constitutional grounds, state regulation of many of the
interstate commerce aspects of the natural-gas business." 126 The
ultimate aim of the legislation was the "[p]rotection of consumers
against exploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies." 127
Therefore, the Court could not permit efforts to weaken this protection
by "amendatory legislation" exempting independent natural gas
producers from federal regulation. One might argue that the Phillips
case is one in which Minton's New Deal liberalism influenced his
decision to favor consumers over businesses, but even so, it is hard to
see how Minton could have concluded otherwise. Having voted for the
Natural Gas Act in 1938, he had first-hand knowledge of the
congressional intent behind the Act. Deciding in favor of Phillips
would have thwarted that intent.
Minton generally favored national regulation of business
activity, but unless Congress had preempted a power specifically,
Minton was willing to defer to state regulation. In PanhandleEastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, Minton
explained how Congress had allocated regulatory power under the

125. Id. at 682.
126. Id. at 682-83.
127. Id. at 685.
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Natural Gas Act. 128 The point of contention was whether the Michigan
Public Service Commission could require a natural gas pipeline
company to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity
before it could sell gas that was transported through an interstate
pipeline directly to industrial companies that already were being
served by the municipal public utility. Panhandle attempted to secure
for itself large industrial accounts that already were served by the
public utility. It argued that its direct sales were beyond the reach of
local government because they constituted interstate commerce, which
only Congress could regulate.
Minton disagreed. He said that Congress intended to leave to
the states sales that were "primarily of local interest.'' 29 As in
Phillips, Minton argued that the primary aim of the regulation was to
protect consumers against exploitation by natural gas companies. To
that end, he said Congress "meant to create a comprehensive and
effective regulatory scheme, complementary in its operation to those of
the states and in no manner usurping their authority."'130 He thought
that cooperative action was required if the protective scheme of the
legislation was to be served. That could not be accomplished if
interstate suppliers of natural gas could divert the bulk of their
business to unregulated purchases by industrial users.
In other areas of economic regulation, Minton had one of the
strongest records on the Court of ruling for government agencies. To
close observers who were knowledgeable about his opinions on the
Seventh Circuit, this came as no surprise, for he regularly ruled in
favor of government regulation of business. On the Supreme Court,
Minton continued his pro-government voting record. In the twenty
non-unanimous cases involving decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board, Minton sided with the agency in all but five, a record
second only to Burton's.' 3' In the twelve non-unanimous cases
involving the Interstate Commerce Commission, Minton supported the
agency ten times, the most of any Justice. 32 His opinions in economic
regulation cases were the result of his deference to legislative intent
and based on his interpretation of the authorizing statutes. He was
willing to let agencies exercise broad discretion, but only if it was
based on an explicit grant of authority from Congress. Determining
whether this was the case required Minton to interpret the statutes as

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

341 U.S. 329, 334-36 (1951).
Id. at 333.
Id. at 335.
Atkinson, supra note 25, at 327-28.
Id. at 334.
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they were written without adding any additional meaning. No doubt
his own legislative experience helped him in this regard, as he often
had participated in the legislative process when the economic
regulation was adopted.
VI. THE CASE FOR MINTON
The consistency of Minton's commitment to a philosophy of
judicial restraint is amply supported by his voting record in virtually
every area of the law. His was a philosophy based on his conception of
the Court's role in a democratic system with a separation of powers.
He remained loyal to the notion of a limited judiciary, and he was ever
loyal to the institution itself. He was particularly conscious of the need
to protect the Court's reputation in the eyes of the public, and he
sought to protect it as best he could.
Minton was very concerned about the legitimacy of the Court
and the respect accorded to its decisions. White argues that the
legitimacy of a judicial decision rests on the degree to which it is
perceived as being grounded in "legal criteria," which judges are
deemed to be competent to judge, rather than on "the whims of the
public." 133 Minton's approach to decisionmaking and opinion writing
placed a strong emphasis on the legitimacy of Court rulings. For
example, Minton was troubled by the large number of concurring and
dissenting opinions written in high profile cases. Minton wrote only
three concurring opinions and relatively few dissenting opinions. One
reason he gave a former law clerk for retiring from the bench was the
increasing frequency with which he dissented in cases.13 4 Minton
thought that Court opinions should reflect the collective judgment of
the Court rather than multiple individual opinions because multiple
opinions undermine the integrity of the decision. When assigned an
opinion, he would go out of his way to accommodate the views of other
Justices where possible in order to gain support for the opinion. No
other Justice was known as much as Minton for his considerate
efforts.
Minton also thought it was important that decisions be seen as
reflecting legal criteria and not political considerations. Even though
he was highly partisan before donning his judicial robes, most
observers of Minton's Court performance acknowledge that he
generally rose above partisanship in writing his opinions. In one of his

133. WHITE, supra note 26, at 468.
134. GUGIN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 25, at 269 (citing Letter from Sherman Minton to Harry
L. Wallace (July 6,1955)).
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many exchanges with Frankfurter, he said that "if the law is to be
135
respected it must be considered as something other than a game."
His exchange with former law clerk George Braden reveals Minton's
position. Braden criticized the Adler opinion and said it "leaves the
impression that you not only believed the law to be Constitutional, you
also think it is a good law."1 36 Minton replied:
I don't see why you think I approved the policy of that law. As you well know one may
have a view on policy that may not agree with the Constitutional question involved. In
my own experience I hotly opposed while
a Senator the Hatch Act as a matter of policy. I
13 7
never questioned its Constitutionality.

Attorney Nicholas Katzenbach, eulogizing Minton in 1965, referred to
his ability to transcend partisanship: "He was at pains to separate
predispositions from the decision-making process; indeed on occasion
he noted his personal distaste for the actions of parties in whose favor
'138
he felt constrained to decide.
Minton did not believe in lengthy opinions. Intelligibility was of
utmost importance to him. To that end, his opinions were brief and to
the point. He thought of opinions merely as vehicles for conveying the
Court's decision. He once told a friend he did not consider that he was
"writing for the ages."'139 His observation about the opinions in the
Rabinowitz decision illustrates the contrast between Minton and some
of the other Justices. He noted that Frankfurter's dissent from the
bench in Rabinowitz took thirty-five or forty minutes, while it took
Minton "less than 10 minutes to announce the opinion of the
[C]ourt."' 140 Regarding the Rabinowitz decision, Braden, Minton's
former law clerk, told him, "You write in the style of Roberts and
Sutherland. That is, you assume the answer then ask how anyone can
decide contrary to the assumed answers.' 4' Minton responded:
[M]aybe my opinion writing does smack of Roberts and Sutherland. Frankly... while I
never agreed with what Sutherland had to say as a general rule, I remember that he

135. Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter (July 10, 1955) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
136. Letter from George Braden to Sherman Minton (Mar. 19, 1952) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
137. Letter from Sherman Minton to George Braden (Mar. 20, 1952) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
138, Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Mr. Justice Minton,
384 U.S. v, xxi (1966) [hereinafter Proceedings].
139. Letter from Sherman Minton to George Braden (Mar. 20, 1950) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
140. Id.
141. Letter from George Braden to Sherman Minton (Sept. 12, 1950) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
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was the easiest fellow in2 the books for me to read. When I finished his opinions, I at
14
least understood them.

While not all viewed Minton's approach to opinion writing in
positive terms, even some of his critics acknowledge that his opinions
were "very much to the point, and leave no doubt.., as to what they
are supposed to do.' 143 Lower court judges in particular approve of his
style. For example, a federal district court judge in Arkansas wrote to
thank Minton for "his common sense and direct approach" to the
law. 144 He said, "It is refreshing for a 'Country Lawyer' or a 'Country
Judge' to read an opinion of the highest court in our land which clearly
and succinctly states the problem and then answers in plain everyday
145
language that cannot be constructed three or four different ways."
Chief Justice Earl Warren, describing Minton's opinions at a memorial
service, said he was "totally without guile and with absolute honesty
of expression, he wrote for the Court or in dissent so that no one could
146
be misled by what he said.'
Minton's letter to an old friend probably provides the most
astute explanation of his judicial approach:
Since I have been here ...I have tried to call them as I saw them and in doing so I seem
to have earned the designation of a conservative. Maybe I am. I certainly consider a job
on this Court to be vastly different than that of a United States Senator. In the Senate
you fight for policy. Here, while there must inevitably be some policy-making in some of
the decisions involving the construction of the Constitution, policy-making, in my
opinion, should be kept at a very minimum and avoided in all cases not absolutely
necessary. Consequently I have upheld Government rather consistently, and have felt
bound, in most instances, to follow the law as it had been laid down. At least I have
tried to do what I thought was right in each case that14came
here, as it appeared to me
7
on the record, uninfluenced by all extraneous matters.

Minton's rulings on the Court often disappointed those who
expected him to side with the "liberal" Justices. New Deal liberals had
disparaged an activist Court that invalidated New Deal policies, but
once in control, they found no problem with an activist judiciary on
issues of civil liberties and civil rights. In this regard, they subscribed
to the rule established in Carolene Products, which gave greater
142. Letter from Sherman Minton to George Braden (Sept. 20, 1950) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
143. Frank, supranote 113, at 52.
144. Letter from John E. Miller to Sherman Minton (Feb. 11, 1950) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review and original available at the Lilly Library, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana).
145. Id.
146. Proceedings,supra note 138, at xxv.
147. Letter from Sherman Minton to Frank McHale (Sept. 19, 1956) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review and original available at the Lilly Library, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana).
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judicial scrutiny when individual freedoms and equal rights were at
stake. Minton was not willing to justify judicial activism for these
issues. His aversion to judicial intervention was too deeply woven into
the fabric of his jurisprudence to accept this kind of "double standard."
Minton's departure from the Court ushered in a new era on the
Court. He was perhaps the last Justice to defend judicial restraint
regardless of the type of issue at stake. The debates about restraint
and activism did not end with Minton's departure, but the rationales
for each disposition took on different hues. The Warren Court
embraced the kind of activism that Minton abhorred. In the parlance
of Carolene Products, the activists justified judicial intervention as
necessary to promote democracy by defending the rights of minorities
and the freedom of those whose views were not consistent with
mainstream American thought. Minton would have agreed with critics
of the Warren Court who thought "it had usurped legislative priorities
in an area where democratic theory called for deference." 148 In
particular, issues of legislative reapportionment, school prayer, and
criminal procedure often are cited as examples of the Warren Court
overstepping its bounds.
Minton espoused a majoritarian philosophy of judicial restraint
that increasingly lost credibility with the Warren Court, and its
demise continued through the Burger Court. He might have been
somewhat more comfortable on the Burger Court, which was less
doctrinaire, more moderate, and more ad hoc in its approach to
resolving issues. It did, however, take a more activist stance in
advancing the cause of gender equity by invalidating state statutes
based on sex classifications. For example in Reed v. Reed 149 the Court
found that an Idaho statute giving preference to males as
administrators of estates when a person died without a will violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Frontierov.
Richardson1 50 invalidated a congressional statute that allowed wives
of male service members to be claimed as dependents, without proof of
their dependency, making them eligible for medical and dental
benefits. Husbands of female service members had to prove their
dependency to be eligible for fringe benefits. In Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan 51 single-sex nursing schools at a state-supported
institution were found to be unconstitutional. The Burger Court also
carved out a new constitutional right to personal privacy through its
148.
149.
150.
151.

WHITE, supra note 26, at 462.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
458 U.S. 718 (1892).
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most famous opinion-Roe v. Wade-in 1973.152 These cases illustrate
that the Burger Court was not necessarily inclined to defer to
legislative prerogatives or to consider whether the Court was usurping
the legitimate role of state legislatures in deciding such matters as
gender discrimination, proper sexual relations, or the conditions under
which abortion was permissible. Instead, White says that "any debates
that existed in these cases were debates about the substantive
strength of the constitutional rights being advanced .... [They] were
about substance, not debates pitting substance against process," which
characterized the debates of the Warren Court. To the extent that the
Burger Court was unconcerned with whether a right "needs to be
properly crafted or institutionally sensitive," 153 Minton would not have
found much common ground.
Without a doubt, Minton would have been completely out of
place on the Rehnquist Court, where debates about the proper judicial
role and appropriate constraints revolved around a completely
different set of philosophies. Neither side granted much credence to
democratic theory. Instead, the divisions were between those Justices
whose decisions were premised on their interpretation of the "original
meaning" of the Constitution and those who based judicial
interpretation on the concept of the "living Constitution." As White
notes, "[T]he center of jurisprudential debates on the Rehnquist Court
moved from issues of democratic theory and comparative institutional
competence to issues of history and theories of constitutional
interpretation."' 15 4 Both approaches increased judicial supremacy visa-vis the other branches of government, a development of which
Minton would have disapproved.
Decisions on the Rehnquist Court in many instances appear to
have been driven by political ideology more so than legal criteria. One
easily can imagine the apoplexy that Minton would have expressed
when learning that the Court in Bush v. Gore announced that its
opinion stopping the vote recount in Florida was "limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities."'155 In effect, the
Court was saying that its ruling had no precedential value. Minton
would have chided the Court for such an assertion. To Minton, there
was no such thing as a case without precedential value. Indeed, there
has been scholarly speculation about the implications of Bush v.Gore

152. 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
153. WHITE, supra note 26, at 402-03.

154. Id. at 463.
155. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
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for future constitutional adjudication related to the electoral
process, 156 and Bush v. Gore has been cited in subsequent decisions
157
involving electoral disputes.
It is interesting to speculate how Minton's philosophy of
judicial restraint would have influenced his decision in Bush v. Gore.
If he were consistent with that philosophy, which he usually was, he
would have erred on the side of limiting the role of the Supreme Court.
To that end, he most likely would have refused to accept the case for
review, leaving the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court in place. On
the circuit court, Minton insisted that federal courts should respect
the jurisdiction of state courts. He once wrote that "Federal Courts are
being used to invade the sovereign jurisdiction of the States, presumed
to be competent to handle their own affairs . . . We are not superlegislatures."1 5 8 Although Minton was writing about a criminal appeal
that sought to overturn a state court ruling, his response nonetheless
is indicative of his general deference to states. Further, Minton
probably would have had problems with the Court's interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which he
viewed almost exclusively as a prohibition against racial
discrimination. Minton might have questioned whether interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause to aid a candidate who stood to lose an
election went too far beyond the original intent of the amendment as
well as too far beyond the Court's own precedents.
The Bush v. Gore opinion stands as stark testimony to the
activism of the Rehnquist Court and the degree to which partisanship
influenced Court opinions. Lori Ringhand has provided a statistical
analysis of the Rehnquist Court that assesses the extent of its
activism and the degree to which partisanship influenced its
decisionmaking. Ringhand used three criteria to measure activism:
overturning laws of Congress, overturning state statutes, and
overturning precedents.1 59 While the analysis of the three criteria
reveals mixed results, several findings do attest to an activist bent
156. Thomas D. Kotulak, Bush v. Gore: Two Competing Conceptions of Democracy, 11 J. IND.
ACAD. SOC. SCI. 71-86 (2007).
157. For examples of scholarly works that discuss the use of Bush v. Gore as precedent in
subsequent cases, see Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of Constitutional Choices in Light of
Bush v. Gore, in THE FINAL ARBITER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE FOR LAW AND

POLITICS 29 (Christopher P. Banks, David B. Cohen & John C. Green eds,, 2005) [hereinafter
THE FINAL ARBITER]; Joyce A. Baugh, Bush v. Gore and Equal Protection:A Unique Case?, in
THE FINAL ARBITER, supra, at 87; Tracy A. Thomas, Bush v. Gore and the Distortion of Common
Law Remedies, in THE FINAL ARBITER, supra, at 71.
158. United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1948).
159. Lori A. Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A "By the Numbers" Retrospective, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1033, 1034 (2007).
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that favored conservative outcomes, especially as concerned the
invalidations of federal statutes across a broad range of issues. 160 In
fact, the Rehnquist Court invalidated congressional statutes far more
often than the Warren or Burger Courts. Ringhand notes that the
Rehnquist Court "not only invalidated more federal statutes than its
predecessor courts, it also did so at a much faster rate."'161 Her
analysis confirms that deference was not a strong value on the
Rehnquist Court, but that ideology was a key factor in the Court's
decisions. In a similar study, Ringhand found that the conservative
Justices, collectively and individually, were more likely to invalidate
federal laws and overturn precedents
than their liberal
1 62
counterparts,
while their liberal counterparts were more likely to
invalidate state statutes. Both conservatives and liberals, Ringhand
concludes, "have used their power. . . in ideologically predictable
ways."'163 While Minton's rulings may have been predictable based on
the principles of deference, precedent, and strict interpretation, his
opinions were not predictable on the basis of his political ideology. It is
one of the main reasons that liberals often were disappointed in his
rulings. It no doubt has been a primary factor in how Court scholars
with a bias toward activism have assessed his record.
From today's vantage point, it appears that the Roberts Court
has picked up where the Rehnquist Court left off, arguing mainly
about original meaning and historical interpretation, with limited
concern for the counter-majoritarian dilemma. The kind of judicial
deference advocated by Minton continued its decline with his
departure from the Court in 1956 and has not resurfaced in a
consistent manner in successor Courts. His own words about his
retirement seem more prophetic than ever. Responding to a reporter's
questions on the day of his retirement, Minton said, "There will be
more interest in who will succeed me than in my passing. I am an
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echo."1
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